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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how irregular status impacts a range of human 
development outcomes for labour migrants. The analysis indicates that for poorer labour 
migrants, irregular (or undocumented) migration provides a positive, private return to income 
and livelihood improvements for themselves and their families as compared to 1) no movement 
at all, and at times, 2) regular (or documented) migration. However, irregular status is associated 
with a range of forms of disadvantage and vulnerabilities that often compromise migrants’ rights, 
entitlements and the rate of return they achieve from the migration process. Migrants are as 
rational as other members of the population and, being aware of these vulnerabilities, many still 
choose to migrate.  The larger hypothesis of this paper is that, as long as poverty drives 
migration, legal status will not be a priority for migrants. Migrants will be willing to endure short 
to medium term hardship and the undermining of a range of capabilities and rights (such as 
education, social assets, rights and personal welfare) to provide economic safety nets for their 
families and future improvements to their (and their families) livelihoods and wellbeing. As long 
as migrants on average achieve a positive increase in income and assets through the migration 
experience (which they do) they will sacrifice a whole range of freedoms and rights.  It is 
therefore imperative that policy makers make active steps to protect migrants with regard to 
basic human rights and facilitate positive outcomes from their migration experiences.  In 
particular, we urge southern governments to advocate for all their migrants abroad, regardless of 
legal status. If southern country governments accept the mainstream opinion that migration is 
good for development, and furthermore recognise that a substantial number, if not the majority, 
of their migrants are irregular, and continue sending remittances and investment, then 
governments should seek to protect their citizens aboard, facilitate safe remittances, and begin to 
stand firm in the face of pressure to control national borders.  
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1. Introduction 
The potential for positive linkages between migration and development has been increasingly 
recognised in recent years, with a spate of books, articles and international conferences focused 
on this theme.  In fact, there is a growing body of opinion that migration is good for 
development.  This theme has been taken forward in a ‘High Level Dialogue on Migration and 
Development’ as part of the meeting of the UN General Assembly in 2006, as well as estimates 
from the World Bank that an increase in temporary international mobility of the order of 3 per 
cent of developed countries’ workforces could generate up to $356 bn in benefits annually, fairly 
evenly distributed between rich and poor countries (World Bank 2006).  
 
Yet in terms of international migration at least, the policy context for poor people to use 
migration as a route out of poverty often remains limited.  In particular, although there has been 
an expansion of international migration into northern economies over the past decade, especially 
to the United States and European countries with relatively high economic growth rates, these 
countries have generally retained and sometimes strengthened relatively restrictive immigration 
rules.  As a result, legal migration routes have been opened primarily only to more educated 
individuals and to special categories of migrants such as refugees (although recently there have 
been some significant changes).  In turn, a significant proportion of migrants have been pushed 
towards more ‘irregular’ modes of entry into the North – as well as to some southern countries, 
with the result that they enter sectors of the labour market where jobs are less secure, wages and 
working conditions are generally poorer, and where there may be a constant threat of discovery 
and deportation.1  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how irregular status impacts a range of human 
development outcomes for labour migrants.2 First, using primary data and secondary evidence 
we support the increasingly held view that it is inappropriate to use simple dichotomies when 
                                                
1 Throughout this paper we use the terms irregular and undocumented interchangeably.  However, strictly speaking, 
as will be discussed in section 2, undocumented is a special case of irregular. 
2 This paper focuses explicitly on voluntary labour migrant. Whilst recognising the ‘mixed-migration’ problematic, 
as comprehensively reviewed by van Hear et al. (2009), in this paper we allow ‘voluntary labour migration’ to 
include all migrants who migrate from purposes of securing job opportunities and higher income. It is voluntary in 
the sense that the migrants have not moved in response to physical insecurity arising from conflict or violent threat. 
We fully appreciate that many poor labour migrants are compelled to move out of necessity, in fact our main 
hypothesis is built on this assumption. However, due to the mainstream understandings of ‘forced migration’ we 
choose not to use this term. 
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describing migrant status for instance between irregular and regular migrants (also referred to as 
legal/illegal; authorised/unauthorised; documented/undocumented). Instead we point out the 
many shades of grey that exist according to a range of legal statuses. We then move on to 
propose that, for the majority of labour migrants across the globe, poverty, the need to manage 
risk and the motivation to improve livelihoods and capabilities, is the main migration driver. We 
argue that poorer migrants are more likely to engage in irregular migration (with the incorrect 
documentation or no documentation) than non-poor migrants due to reasons of necessity, 
structural constraints that restricted access to legal routes of migration, and informational 
barriers.   
 
We then move to discuss the incentives for (non)compliance from a migrant perspective.  
Evidence is drawn on to argue that, as far as direct economic benefits from migration are 
concerned (such as, fulfilment of basic needs, increases in wealth and assets), legal status is not 
causally related to a positive outcome.  Sometimes regular status may actually work against a 
positive outcome.  However, we go on to focus on exploring the costs of being irregular in terms 
of social, political and distributional indicators. Irregular status exacerbates migrant disadvantage 
and vulnerability on a number of counts.  As the poor are more likely to engage in irregular 
migration, they face the double disadvantage of poverty-specific vulnerabilities as well as 
irregular-migration vulnerabilities. Poorer migrants need to weigh up whether the poverty 
alleviating and asset enhancing benefits from irregular migration compensate for a plethora of 
possible disadvantages, such as: exploitation; deskilling; extortion; exclusion; insecurity; 
discrimination; lack of rights; and lack of safety at work.  We trace the impacts of irregular status 
on a range of human development outcomes using secondary sources and primary survey 
sources.  In conclusion, we draw out implications of the work with a view to maximising the 
benefits and minimising the risks of migration for irregular migrants. 
 
Methodology and Datasets 
The data used for primary analysis in this report comes from a number of quantitative specialised 
migrant surveys and qualitative surveys conducted as part of the research project on Social 
Protection: Portability, Access and Regimes of Reciprocity.  The datasets are as follows: 
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1. a survey of 201 Malawian return migrants from the UK 
2. a survey of 150 Malawian return migrants from South Africa 
3. a survey of 207 Ghanaians in Nigeria 
4. a survey of 107 Ghanaians in the UK 
5. a qualitative survey of 17 current Malawian migrants residing in Johannesburg 
6. qualitative interviews with Ghanaians in the UK, Malawians in the UK and Ghanaian 
returnees from Nigeria. 
 
The surveys were conducted at various times between January 2007 and January 2008.  They 
collected information on a range of themes, including: decision to migrate; employment 
trajectories during migration; legal status and change in status; access to formal and informal 
social protection; poverty indicators; assets, remittances and associational membership. For the 
purposes of this paper we draw selectively on data that provides insights into dimensions of legal 
status, migrant characteristics and migration outcomes. 
 
2. Characteristics of irregular migrants 
Numbers 
Accurate estimates of the flows and stocks of international migrants are extremely difficult to 
obtain, especially in light of the following: 1) the majority of migration is short-term, circular 
and/or seasonal (ie, under 12 months), whereas official estimates only include people living 
abroad for over 12 months; 2) many countries do not have robust or reliable databases containing 
migrant numbers; and 3) these numbers do not include flow estimates.  It is likely, then, that the 
number of international migrants is significantly, if not vastly, higher than this estimate. 
 
If it is hard to obtain an accurate picture of regular migration stocks, how much more unreliable 
are the attempts to estimate irregular migrant stocks and flows?  Exact numbers of irregular 
migrants are difficult to estimate for a number of reasons discussed below, but it is clear that 
irregular migration occurs on a large scale — and is a global phenomenon. The Pew Hispanic 
Center estimates that there are 11.5 to 12 million ‘unauthorised’ migrants in the US (Passel 
2006) and, despite the attempts of European countries to limit immigration of ‘unskilled’ 
workers, there are an estimated 5 to 6.5 million ‘undocumented’ migrants in the EU (Euskirchen 
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et al. 2007) — although the latter figure does include all irregular migrants. Estimates from the 
UK  stand anywhere between half a million and one million irregular migrants.  Irregular 
migrants are also common in migration contexts within the Global South. For example, there are 
large flows of irregular migrants to South Africa from other countries in the Southern African 
Development Community (Oliver 2008).  Finger-in-the-wind estimates suggest that irregular 
migrants comprise between 5-10 per cent of total migrant stock.   
 
With respect to other OECD destinations estimates exist on the share of irregular migration.  
UNESA (2005) estimates the Russian migrants stock at 12 million, the irregular migrants 
comprising approximately 29 per cent. In 2008, the irregular stock stood at 3.5 million (Alexeev 
2008).  Thailand estimates for irregular stand at around 55 per cent.  Estimates from 2005 put 
South Africa’s irregular stock at 45% and in Kazakhstan estimates reach as high as 98% 
(UNESA 2005).  
 
Clearly, the above estimates must be considered with much caution, if considered at all.  More so 
than regular migrant stock estimates, irregular estimates suffer from a range of methodological 
problems.  For example, irregular migrants are not always recorded in macro-data instruments. 
Estimates of undocumented migrants are often calculated using the ‘residual method’, which 
involves subtracting the number of migrants in census data from the total number of known legal 
migrants in the country. This technique is often imprecise, and in any case provides only a partial 
window into the volume of irregular migration. Another popular way of measuring numbers of 
irregular migrants is to look at apprehension rates of migrants at border points, under the 
assumption that most migrants are apprehended.  This method is unreliable as it is impossible to 
tell the number of migrants apprehended as a proportion of the total number of migrants crossing 
the border.  Furthermore, evidence from the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) shows that 
migrants who have been apprehended are more likely to attempt to re-migrate.  With successive 
attempts and with the aid of migration information networks, migrants become more skilled at 
crossing the border without being apprehended (Donato et al. 1992).  
 
A further significant barrier to conducting research on irregular migrants is the fact that it is often 
difficult for researchers to gain access to them.  Irregular migrants may be unwilling to come 
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forward for interview for fear of being reported to immigration-related authorities.  Moreover, 
those who do come forward may be a specific higher risk group, thus causing selection problems 
for any survey design or analysis.  If they do come forward they may chose to conceal 
information concerning legal status, networks and employment, thus introducing bias into the 
survey method.  Ethnographic methods are one way to attempt to overcome these problems; 
however this introduces large costs in terms of length of time in the field and a limited number of 
respondents.  Another, more appealing way to obtain ‘true’ information on migrants’ experience 
is to interview returnees within their own countries.  The sample may still be subject to the 
problem of selection bias but problems of concealed information and misinformation are likely 
to be minimised.  
 
Status Blur 
Many studies of migrants acknowledge the importance of migrants’ legal status in a country as a 
possible determinant of employment decisions, sectors of employment, housing decisions and 
social protection decisions (among other things). However, due to data constraints the majority 
of studies are unable to interrogate these issues.  If surveys do collect information on legality it is 
typically in the form of a question, for example: ‘Are you legally entitled to remain in the 
country?’ or ‘Do you have the formal documentation to allow you to legally stay in the country?’  
While this line of questioning provides some basic information as to whether a migrant is legally 
residing within a country, it sheds little light on other factors, such as whether their legal status 
has been changing while at their destination or whether the migrant has strategically chosen to 
become undocumented. Furthermore, the simplistic method of this kind of enquiry leads to false 
dichotomous labelling where the tendency is to divide all international migrants into 
documented/undocumented; legal/illegal; authorised/unauthorised; regular/irregular migrants. 
These binaries obscure the empirical reality that the legal status of many international migrants 
shifts during their time in host countries. For example, some migrants may enter countries 
through legal channels and later become ‘undocumented’ by overstaying their visas, while others 
may violate the terms of visitor visas by working without permission. Irregular migration refers 
to a broader group of migrants than the ‘undocumented’ category allows for, encompassing any 
migrant who is in violation of the terms of their admission into their host country. This includes 
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migrants who enter countries illegally, failed asylum seekers, migrants who overstay their visas, 
and those who have a legal right to remain but work illegally.  
 
Carefully distinguishing between different categories - undocumented, documented with right to 
remain and not work, and documented with right to work - allows us to explore in much more 
detail the way in which migrants interact with local labour markets and the strategies they might 
use to balance various types of legal status with employment opportunities and employment 
status. Legality of employment has obvious implications for migrants’ access to social 
provisioning, both through the employer and workplace as well as through claims made on the 
state.     
 
Table 1 below indicates the change in legal status of Malawian and Ghanaian survey respondents 
at arrival in the UK and upon departure (source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008).  As anticipated, only 
2.5 per cent of Malawians and 12.6 per cent of Ghanaians arrived in the UK without any form of 
documentation - in other words, completely illegally.  Whereas, at the point of departure, 27 per 
cent and 30 per cent  were without any form of documentation to support their continued stay in 
the UK.  The majority of migrants claimed to have some form of documentation on arrival and 
on departure.  
 
The category of ‘legal’ or ‘documented’ is not a particularly useful one when interrogating 
migrant labour patterns and employment rights.  Disaggregating ‘legal’ into its constituent parts, 
Table 1 shows that only 14 per cent of Malawian migrants and 8.7 per cent of Ghanaian migrants 
had the ‘right to work’ upon arrival to the UK.  A further 6 and 16 per cent respectively were not 
working (in keeping with their legal status); however a massive 65 and 55 per cent of migrants in 
the UK stated that while they had the legal entry requirements they were in fact working 
illegally.  
 
Over time we see that the number of legal-entry/illegal-workers reduces to approximately 36 per 
cent and17 per cent respectively, however this is matched by a huge increase in undocumented 
migrants.  For the Ghanaians we also witness a large increase in the number of migrants who 
have been able to obtain the right to work legally and full-time.  For the Malawians this increase 
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is much more modest.  Over time we see that some migrants are able to obtain the right to work, 
whereas many others become completely undocumented by staying in the UK beyond the legally 
allowed time.  
 
Table 1: Fluidity of legal status between arrival and departure 
 Malawians-UK Ghanaians-UK 
 Arrival Departure Arrival Departure 
Undocumented 2.5 26.8 12.6 29.6 
Documented 97.5 73.1 87.4 70.4 
 A. Entry docs only 70.6 49.2 71.8 18.4 
 Illegal workers 64.7 36.3 55.3 17.2 
 Not working 5.9 12.9 16.5 1.2 
 B. Right to Work F/T 14 16.9 8.7 46.9 
 C. Other 12.9 6.9 6.9 5.1 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008 
 
The blurring of legal status is compounded by the hugely complex and intricate immigration 
laws and regulation in many countries.  For instance in the UK there are over 80 different types 
of entry and immigration status.  
 
Compliance framework 
Ruhs and Anderson (2006) usefully provide a more nuanced way of categorising different types 
of legal status.  They distinguish between three levels of compliance:  compliant migrants are 
legally resident and working in full compliance with the employment restrictions attached to 
their immigration status;  non-compliant migrants are those without the right to reside in the 
host country (i.e. those “illegally resident”); and semi-compliance indicates a situation where 
migrants are legally resident but working in violation of some or all of the employment 
restrictions attached to their immigration status. (see figure 1 below). A migrant can enter a 
country as resident compliant or resident non-compliant.  If the latter, then the migrant is 
classified as non-compliant.  This corresponds to someone who is completely without documents 
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of any kind.  Alternatively the labour migrant may enter the country as resident-compliant and 
employment-compliant, thus this person becomes classified as fully compliant.    
 
The more complex and fuzzy category is that of semi-compliance.  The category of semi-
compliance – the “space between” strict legality and illegality – is extremely broad and captures 
a wide range of violations of the conditions of employment attached to a migrant’s immigration 
status, with varying degrees of severity.  Consider the case of four student visa holders working 
20, 21, 25 and 40 hours per week respectively in the UK.  Clearly, there is a substantial 
difference – in terms of the degree to which the employment restrictions attached to immigration 
status are violated – between a student who works 21 hours per week and a student who works 
40 hours per week.  The discussion of where and how the line should be drawn between semi-
compliance and non-compliance – or indeed between compliance and semi-compliance – can be 
highly politicized and the decision might often rest on a personal judgement, with different 
actors drawing the line in different places. This is an example of how illegality is “socially 
constructed”. 
 
Figure 1: Compliance Framework 
 
Source: Ruhs and Anderson 2006 
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3. Incentives for less than full compliance 
An important contribution of the compliance framework is that it draws attention to the agency 
of migrants and their ability to strategise in relation to legal status.  Often labour migrants choose 
non-compliance and semi-compliance over compliance.  This choice reflects the range of 
constraints and vulnerabilities at home as well as the options at and of the destination. The 
decision to migrate irregularly also determines the vulnerabilities and constraints, or 
opportunities, that will face the migrant in the future.    
 
Desire to alleviate poverty trumps compliance 
The decision facing the majority of voluntary, relatively poor migrants is whether to stay put at 
home, where they have full legal status, or whether to move, with the expectation of obtaining a 
higher income abroad, where they might not enjoy full legal status and the range of capabilities 
and rights it affords. However, we hypothesise that that this decision is made independent of 
legal status.  The main considerations that influence this decision are current and future family 
welfare as well as the ability to finance the trip. Recognising that expected income is a 
determinant of migration (as in the Harris-Todaro model and others such as those of Kennan and 
Walker), we argue that realised income, or poverty in the current period, is also a significant 
determinant of migration.  In other words, it is not just prior moves that influence subsequent 
opportunities, but also prior opportunities influence moves which in turn influence future 
opportunities.  Thus we should recognise the importance of initial conditions, specifically 
poverty, as a determinant to migration.   
 
In keeping with Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2008), we forward that as long as people can cover the 
minimum costs of a move, the ‘poverty threshold’ will determine migration choice.  This 
threshold is likely to be highly context specific; it could be defined in relation to an objective 
measure such as income or, more likely, a comparative, relative or subjective benchmark.  
Individuals who are poorer (in a multidimensional sense of the term) are more likely to migrate 
as long as they see a payoff for doing so.  Movement is influenced by their relative position with 
respect to this threshold.  For poorer households the incentive for non-compliance is 
overwhelmed by a concern to secure welfare (reduce poverty) for the migrant and the family. In 
other words welfare concerns trump legal status concerns. We would go so far as to argue that 
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poorer people are much more likely to engage in irregular migration due to: 1) binding poverty 
constraints at origin and thus the lure of a better livelihood; 2) the high transaction costs of 
obtaining legality (see below); and 3) structural constraints that restrict access to legal routes of 
migration.  The poorer migrants migrate out of necessity, thus the luxury of legal status 
considerations are not a priority. 
 
Poorer migrants prioritise family welfare, as indicated from qualitative work with 17 irregular 
migrants living in two townships of Johannesburg.3  All respondents cited poverty as a reason for 
coming to South Africa, often encouraged by either family members or friends at home or in 
South Africa.  The majority of respondents did not want to stay in South Africa.  Thus, for them, 
migration is, in and of itself, a means of social protection for themselves and their families, both 
in South Africa and in Malawi. All but one of the migrants interviewed had a clear objective to 
their migration.  Many times the objective was to fund a very specific investment, such as ‘to 
build a roof on my house back in the village’, or ‘to cover the costs of secondary school for one 
of my daughters’, or ‘to purchase a fishing net’ or ‘to buy a popcorn machine.’  These plans were 
time bound and most of the migrants had performed calculations about the exact time it would 
take (given their current salary) to fund the investment and return home.  
 
Frans, a Malawian migrant in Jo’Burg tells of the poverty that caused him to migrate: 
 
“I am 40-years-old and first came to South Africa in 1991. My cousin was working and 
living in Johannesburg. I was doing small-scale farming in Malawi and not making much 
of a living for the family. The soil was poor and fertiliser expensive, so I was only growing 
enough for the family to eat – sometimes, we ran out before the next harvest. There was no 
opportunity to find any work in Malawi. My cousin in Johannesburg said I should come to 
Johannesburg and look for a job. He helped me find my first contract job here. But it 
wasn’t enough. So, I looked for work by standing on the street corners and waiting for 
employers to stop and offer work. I was picked up by a White man with a grass cutting 
business who needed additional labour.” 
                                                
3 A qualitative, micro-study was undertaken of a group of 17 Malawians living in Johannesburg, South Africa in 
2008, the majority of whom were “undocumented”, “irregular”, or, in terms of official interpretations of the 
Immigration Act, “illegal”.  Four of the respondents were women, and 13 men. 
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The reason that livelihood concerns so often trump formal legal requirements for deciding 
migrants is that migration itself represents a critical, possibly the most vital, form of insurance 
and risk mitigation for the migrant and their family.  Approximately 45 per cent of migrants 
returning from the UK and South Africa accumulated physical assets in their home country as a 
result of migration. However the nature of investments differ quite highly between migrants.  
Figure 2 below shows that significantly more UK migrants invested in land back home (27 per 
cent as compared to 8 per cent), whereas SA migrants invested significantly more in housing and 
small livestock.  
 
Figure 2: The impact of migration on physical assets in home country (per centage saying yes) 
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Source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008 
 
Similar data from Ghanaians in Nigeria shows that the vast majority of respondents (81.7 per 
cent) were able to use their migration to build securities for their future. The above data 
converges to show that the majority of respondents are planning their future social security 
through private means using capital gained through migration. 
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Unregulated labour markets translate into higher income for irregular migrants 
Evidence shows that irregular migrants can at times obtain a higher income than their regular 
counterparts.  For example, for Burmese in Thailand, irregular status is the way to ensure the 
most income. Refugee status leads to no income at all, while registering with sending or 
receiving governments means a significant portion of wages are lost to taxes and/or extortion. 
Therefore, although in this case regularised workers remain in the same jobs as irregular ones, it 
can be demonstrated that their income is negatively affected by legalisation. This is a dynamic 
particular to labour markets where there is little enforcement of rights or social protection, 
factors which provide economic incentives for regularisation in areas such as the US and Europe.  
 
The IRC estimates that there are 2 million Burmese in Thailand, most of them undocumented 
(IRC 2007). The ILO puts the figure at 1.8 million, but does not offer an estimate of the 
proportion of irregular migrants.4 Most of these originally migrated to escape persecution at 
home. However, there is a strong incentive not to register with UNHCR for refugee status. Since 
refugees are forbidden to work, and live in camps where the prohibition can be exercised, they 
are only economically viable as undocumented workers. One Burmese interviewee said, ‘I didn’t 
know what would be the use of being recognized [as a refugee by UNHCR] anyway.’ 
(Koetsawang 2001: 78). 
 
Prohibitive transactions costs 
To regularise their status with their own government, workers from Burma have to register with 
the Burmese authorities before leaving the country. This subjects them to a 10 per cent tax on all 
their income earned abroad. Meanwhile at the Thai end, the official worker registration system, 
designed to legalise and keep track of undocumented workers, acts in various negative ways on 
their chances of working their way out of poverty: 
• When work permits were introduced in 1996, employers were responsible for registering 
and acquiring work permits for their irregular workers. However they made foremen and 
contractors administrative proxies, which resulted in the selling of work permits at 
inflated prices (up to 4,500 baht instead of the official price of 2,500 baht) (Koetsawang 
2001: 80). The average monthly wage in the Thai construction sector in 2006 was 4,706 
                                                
4 http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=78173 
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baht, and in agriculture was 3,019 baht.5 The current exchange rate is 34 Baht to 1 US 
dollar. 
• Registration confined the worker to one job in one place, but most migrants are in sectors 
where they need to remain mobile to work, e.g. construction, agriculture and fishing. The 
other most common sector for Burmese migrants is domestic work (Koetsawang 2001: 
81). 
• Registration also involved regular reporting to the authorities by migrant workers. This 
led to police corruption: they would raid worksites, particularly in construction, looking 
for those who had missed an appointment and extorting money from them. (Koetsawang 
2001: 81) 
• Workers could also be jailed for missing appointments, and had to pay (1,000 baht in the 
case quoted) to get out of jail (Koetsawang 2001: 82). 
 
Overall, both legal migration procedures and regularisation act as a tax on workers, levied 
through various formal and informal mechanisms of bureaucracy and corruption. The market 
price of a work permit is approximately 8 per cent of the official annual income of an employee 
in the construction sector, although evidence shows it is more likely double that of an 
undocumented Burmese worker (Caouette and Pack 2002). A worker who is subjected to police 
raids and imprisonment, which evidence shows are more likely to occur where migrant workers 
are identified through registration procedures, can take another 5-10 per cent (at official 
minimum wage) out of the yearly salary for each occurrence. Therefore a hypothetical worker 
who manages to opt out of regularisation or registration of any kind could be expected to keep a 
minimum of 20 per cent more of their salary than those who regularise. 
 
Inappropriate Social Protection Provisions 
Regular migrants from the South often contribute to social security programmes while working 
abroad, but many have little to show for these contributions when they move on or return home. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of public pensions or health insurance, to which some 
migrants contribute significant sums of money while abroad. Limits to the ‘portability’ (or 
transferability) of pensions gives some short-term migrants less incentive to work in jobs in the 
                                                
5 http://www.d-trac.org/en/average_thai_wages  
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formal sector, if this means contributing to social security schemes from which they will not 
benefit. Moreover, a lack of portability may undermine return or circular migration, as migrants 
who have spent a considerable amount of time in their host countries are likely to factor in the 
loss of benefits if they return to their countries of origin. More drastically, many short term 
migrants will prefer to opt out of the formal, legal system altogether as they wish to avoid tax 
and social security payments.  Furthermore, it is possible that the vulnerabilities that may attract 
insurance in the Global North, such as pensions and life home insurance, may not be priorities 
for poorer migrants from some countries in the South, where health insurance may be a priority.   
 
Priorities for the future expressed by Malawian and Ghanaian migrants to the UK are shown in 
table 2 below.  The most significant investments for the future were savings, housing and land, 
and small business.  Very few migrants were contributing to private pensions or health in home 
country or at destination. This is likely to reflect the preferences of migrants in general, their 
relative lack of attachment to a host labour market and also their relative poverty status. The 
tables illustrates that, overall, compliant migrants make more investments for the future, due in 
large part to their higher levels of initial and current wealth.  However, the social protection 
priorities are similar across all categories of migrants: savings, investment in property and small 
businesses. The different magnitudes and rankings across the migrant groups (Malawians and 
Ghanaians) are likely to reflect the changing investment profiles of current versus returnee 
migrants.  That is, returnees are more likely to have investment in small businesses upon return 
as opposed to current migrants who have yet to repatriate their efforts in full and start businesses. 
 
Table 2: Investments for the Future of South-South Labour Migrants in home locations, per cent 
indicating ‘yes’ 
 Ghanaians in Nigeria Malawian returnees from S.A. 
 compliant Semi-
compliant 
Non-
compliant 
compliant Semi-
compliant 
Non-
compliant 
Savings 60 53 48 53 23 22 
Pensions 
and health 
14 5 8 0 0 1 
Housing 10 2 4 59 34 29 
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and land 
Small 
business 
20 24 16 47 30 45 
Farming 3 2 0 41 9 6 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008 
Limited private economic benefits to regular status 
Wages 
It is very surprising to note that recent, yet limited, evidence from both the USA and the UK 
suggest that there are few, if any, private economic benefits to entering a country with regular 
status.  Benefits here are defined in terms of wage differentials or positive changes in income 
over time.  Evidence from the Mexican Migration Project indicates that a lack of documents has 
no effect on US wages. Factors that do relate to immigrant wages include language, time in the 
job, skill level and receiving-country social networks (Massey 1987). While Massey and 
colleagues show that legality has no impact on wages, citizenship does (Massey et al. 2005).  
 
More recent work by the main author, using data from Ghanaian and Malawian migrants in the 
UK and Malawian migrants in South Africa, revealed a number of interesting findings regarding 
the importance of legal status for the migration prospects of this particular group of migrants.  In 
the case of both UK and South Africa returnees, irregular status did not work against migrants in 
terms of obtaining positive outcomes — which were defined as income change and occupational 
mobility — from their migration, nor did it prevent them from obtaining a positive change in 
their immigration status whilst abroad. Even more striking was the fact that characteristics such 
as marital status, age, wealth and education had little effect on migrants’ success whilst abroad. 
Indeed, length of stay and social protection, including asset-building and access to informal 
social networks, were determined to be the most important aspects of migration success for the 
migrants. It was these factors that largely determined whether temporary labour migration 
allowed migrants to move out of poverty. Very importantly, the results are nuanced by the 
destination of the migrant.  For migrants in closer locations (South Africa) social networks were 
if vital importance, whereas for migrants that travelled long distances, length of stay and 
networks were important (see the box inserted below: Sabates-Wheeler 2008).  
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While regular migrants have, on average, higher incomes, the ability to obtain a positive 
improvement in income is not affected by legal status. We find that for the majority of migrants, 
experience improved income, even those with a negative change in legal status.  However, if a 
migrant retains continual right to work or a positive change in status, (s)he is more likely to have 
an increase in income. So better legal status helps, but still the majority of migrants have an 
increased income, even if they are undocumented.  So illegality does not work against you, but 
legality works for you (heightens a positive effect). 
Destination Matters: duration and social networks 
The table below provides the results of a probit regression estimation.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 
for a positive change in income due to the migration experience, and 0 otherwise.  This variable is not constructed 
from income, but from asking the respondent to evaluate their change in income due to the migration experience. 
We include a number of variables to measure these characteristics, such as age, education, prior income, prior 
occupation, however these are not presented here.  Columns 1 and 3 show point estimates of a regression that 
includes an informal social protection index and length of stay as separate variables.  As expected, we see that 
length of stay is crucially important for UK-migrants in achieving a positive change in income. For the average 
migrant, informal networks (SPIndex) are not significant.  This result resonates with qualitative fieldwork carried 
out within the UK.  Malawians within the UK are a very disparate group with thin associational life.  The few 
interviews we were able to conduct indicated that UK Malawian migrants were highly suspicious of us and of each 
other.  Even family members, who have overstayed, are unlikely to contact each other while in the UK. However for 
SA migrants, informal social protection turns out to be highly significant while length of stay is not significant.   
 
Columns 2 and 4 include an interaction term between time and informal social protection.  The results for UK-
migrants show that length of stay*SPindex is significant at the 10 per cent level.  Length of stay as measured by 
‘Time 2’ is no longer significant.  This suggests that it is the interaction of time and informal social protection that 
allows migrants to achieve a positive result.  In other words, long-stay migrants with relatively more networks 
achieve a better result than short-stay migrants with thin networks, controlling for time and social networks (if we 
specify the time dummy as one year or more then the result becomes significant at the 5 per cent level).  We also ran 
a specification that included initial legal status as an independent variable.  We found this variable to be 
insignificant in explaining increased income due to migration. The story is different for SA-migrants: the interaction 
term is not significant and the informal social protection index remains highly significant.  
 
Table x: Probit regression estimates for determinants of a positive change in income due to migration  
Dependent:  
change in income 
UK-migrants SA-migrants 
 1 2 3 4 
 Beta Beta Beta Beta 
Informal SP Index 0.038 
(0.088) 
-0.108 
(0.135) 
0.256** 
(0.106) 
0.378** 
(0.156) 
Length of migration (years) 0.192** 
(0.061) 
 0.078 
(0.515) 
 
Time dummy 2: (base:<=2) 
 > 2 years 
  
-0.139 
(0.510) 
 0.670 
(0.595) 
SPindex * time 2  0.297* 
(0.170) 
 -0.194 
(0.220) 
     
Observations 
Log likelihood 
192 
-117.66 
192 
-116.05 
141 
-90.93 
141 
-91.53 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler (2008) 
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Contracts and Employment-Related Social Protection 
The research foregrounds the fact that international migrants often have a plethora of alternative 
strategies to access international labour markets and to achieve positive outcomes from their 
overseas migration. For example, many migrants without the right to work had secured formal 
work contracts that were taxed (perhaps in the form of a hidden extortion). Similarly, ‘legal’ 
migrant workers took on jobs in the informal sector of host countries (see table 3 below). Table 3 
below shows a substantial increase in formal legal contracts for migrants with the right to work 
between first and last jobs (from 50 to 80 per cent).  Interestingly, informal verbal contracts 
decrease massively for undocumented migrants between first and last jobs, matched by a 
substantial increase in formal legal contracts for undocumented migrants!!  We also see that 66 
per cent of migrants on entry visas but with work restrictions claim to have formal legal contracts 
in their last/current jobs!! 
 
Table 3: Type of contract in first and last/current jobs in the UK by legal status 
 Non-compliant Semi-compliant Compliant 
 1st Last 1st Last 1st Last 
Formal legal 23.8 41.2 40.2 66.4 50 80 
Informal written 23.8 27.4 27.5 13.6 35 15 
Informal verbal 52.4 19.6 27.9 15 12.5 0 
Other 0 11.7 4.2 5 2.5 5 
Total (no) 21 102 236 140 40 80 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008 
the sample includes 157 Ghanaians who are currently, or returned from the UK and 201 
Malawians returnees from the UK 
 
Many legal migrants saw little point in contributing to formal social security benefits, and this 
made working in the informal sector an attractive option for some migrants. Migrants’ access to 
formal state services in their host countries varied.  
 
According to work status (defined by legal documents) only 12 per cent of migrants were 
entitled to employment-related benefits n their first jobs and 25 per cent in last/current jobs. The 
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table below shows that from those 12 per cent only 71.8 per cent claimed to be entitled to 
benefits in their first job.  This increased to 81.1 per cent in last/current jobs.  The majority of 
other migrants are not entitled to benefits in their first jobs, however, in the ‘entry but illegal 
worker’ category 48 per cent believe they are entitled to benefits in their first job.  This rises to 
64.6 per cent in last/current job.  The increase in entitlement-belief is even more dramatic for the 
undocumented category.  Both of these latter categories are not entitled to any state-funded 
benefits, therefore the conclusions that can be drawn here are that 1) migrants are ignorant of 
their inability to access benefits, or/and 2) migrants are entitled to other employment related 
benefits that are not state-funded.   
 
Table 4: Entitled to benefits in first and last/current jobs? 
 YES 
 First job Last job 
Non-compliant 28.6 55 
Semi-compliant 48.8 64.6 
Compliant 71.8 81.1 
Source: Sabates-Wheeler 2008 
 
Occupational mobility 
Using data on Ghanaians and Malawians to the UK we find that migrants who were employed in 
‘higher’ occupations prior to migration take a relatively bigger hit to occupational status on 
arrival to the UK.  Over 70 per cent of illegal and legal workers are downwardly mobile between 
last job at origin and first job at destination.  Looking at legal status at point of departure and 
occupational mobility between first and last job, non-compliant and semi-compliant workers in 
the UK are more likely to be downwardly mobile than those with the right to work (17 per cent 
as opposed to 10 per cent for other groups) and those with the right to work are more likely than 
other groups to be upwardly mobile (35 per cent and 27 per cent). However, across all groups 
most migrants remain in the same occupations (61 per cent) during the migration experience. 
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4. Relational and Distributional Disadvantage as a Result of Irregular Status  
 
The above section outlines the limited (sometimes negative) impact that regular status has on  
outcomes, specifically quantifiable economic outcomes such as income, occupational mobility, 
and labour force engagement.  That is, in regard to income and income improvement irregular 
status does not appear to have significantly negative outcomes.  In this section we look at other 
aspects of human development, such as social welfare, security, dignity, associational 
participation and inclusion, asking what are the impacts of irregular status on these outcomes?  
Disadvantages or vulnerabilities specific to irregular status define and shape the parameters of 
outcomes for migrants.6 Disadvantage can take three forms: individual, distributional, and 
relational.  Individual forms of disadvantage may arise due to specific characteristics of the 
individual, related to differences in innate ability, but also to some types of disability.  We do not 
deal with this type of disadvantage here.   A relational form of disadvantage can be embedded in 
socio-cultural relationships that reflect differences in the norms, values and customs which 
constitute local constructions of ‘the migrant’, or other groups. These constructions are often 
interwoven with culturally-held notions of legality, race or gender, which can constrain the 
nature of a group’s participation in labour markets.   That is, social constraints may militate 
against their taking up of certain occupations.  These socio-cultural constraints can lead 
individuals and groups to be relatively excluded from access to public goods, such as health and 
education, and from civic engagement.   
 
Table 5: Forms of Disadvantage and Structures of Opportunities for Irregular Migrants 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURES 
OF 
OPPORTUNITIES 
FORMS OF DISADVANTAGE 
Relational Distributional 
Socio-cultural Socio-political Locational 
                                                
6 Much of this conceptual framework draws on R. Sabates-Wheeler and M. Waite, 2003: ‘Migration and Social 
Protection: A Concept Paper’ DRC Migration Working Paper T2, Brighton: University of Sussex 
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Access and 
distribution 
 
 
Social exclusion 
based on ethnicity 
or irregular status; 
isolation;  
 
lack of access based 
on discrimination; 
exploitation;  
unequal distribution 
of resources; 
lack of ‘legal’ status 
leads to economic 
exploitation 
 
Eg. irregular 
migrants in transit 
are unable to access 
services due to 
‘remoteness’ 
Remote, rural 
dwellers –lack 
access to health and 
education 
Ghettoisation of 
different labour 
groups and castes in 
marginal places 
 
Representation 
 
marginalization; 
exclusion from 
participation in 
social life. 
Exclusion of certain 
groups more than 
others (women, 
men; children, 
elderly); 
harassment. 
Lack of 
representation 
(irregular migrants); 
denied participation 
in political life 
Inability to access 
institutions due to 
high transactions 
costs  
 
Recognition 
 
cultural devaluation 
disadvantage; 
language and 
cultural barriers 
lack of rights to 
formal institutions 
due to restrictive 
legislation; more 
prone to injustices; 
discrimination and 
disadvantage of 
some groups to 
Hazards associated 
with work 
environment; dirty, 
dangerous, 
demeaning work.; 
Health risks. 
‘Ghettoisation’ of 
immigrant 
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education, social 
services and 
economic 
opportunities 
communities (eg, 
urban informal 
settlements). 
 
A distributional form of disadvantage could be ‘locational’. For instance, a major factor causing 
vulnerability for migrants is spatial dislocation associated with mobility.  In transit, migrants 
may be ‘remote’ in terms of geography and in terms of access to basic services such as health 
and education.  This is especially relevant for undocumented migrants as their status as it 
precisely these migrants who will be travelling in clandestine form (often across inhospitable 
terrain) which means they have no recourse to legal protection and health services.  A large 
number of irregular migrants are vulnerable to health problems because of inhospitable terrain on 
transit and isolation.  They are also vulnerable to exploitation and poverty due to their spatial dis-
location from economic and social opportunities.  This latter point also holds for many migrants 
at their destination, especially illegal migrants.  Spatial dis-location and the remoteness of transit 
migrations in particular, makes it very difficult for the government to provide formal social 
protection schemes.  It is more often the case that migrants use informal social protection 
mechanisms to help manage risk during transit.  Many migrants rely on informal social 
protection mechanisms, such as migrant networks, to enable them to better manage the spatial 
dislocation from source to destination. Spatial vulnerability also interacts with vulnerabilities 
related to environmental hazards. For instance, the ghettoisation of migrants, particularly illegal 
ones, who are typically located in marginal areas where distribution of all services is thin (think 
of the migrant communities in the townships of Jo’Burg). 
  
Socio-political constraints can constitute both relational and distributional forms of disadvantage. 
They refer to the institutional constraints facing groups (such as children, migrants, women, 
ethnic groups) and typically reflect the lack of political commitment from the destination 
government/society to that group.  This type of vulnerability is especially pronounced for illegal 
migrants who by definition are excluded from participation in political life and from access to 
legal institutions and social and economic benefits.  The exclusionary processes resulting from 
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this determinant of vulnerability often causes the illegal migrant to become further marginalized 
over time, prone to exploitation and discrimination, leading to a spiral into poverty.  
 
Table 5, above, illustrates how forms of disadvantage compromise structures of opportunities. 
Access to various physical, financial, human, and political resources; representation in spaces 
and places that enable people to improve their lives; and recognition – are vital to moving out of 
dependency and marginalised lives.   
 
The case of transit migrants with irregular status provides a useful way of concretising the 
conceptual framework presented above.  As described in the Box below, these migrants face the 
full range of forms of disadvantage as well as restrictions on their opportunities. They have no 
legal recognition, severely restricted access to provisions (nutritional and social),  and no 
opportunities to represent themselves due to a political strategy to keep them separate. 
 
A category of irregular migrant (which often overlaps with transit migrants) that is extremely 
vulnerable, is the ‘stranded migrant,’ R. Dowd (2008) provides a useful exploration into the 
plight of these migrants:  ‘migrants who leave their own country for reasons unrelated to refugee 
status, but who become destitute and/or vulnerable to human rights abuses in the course of their 
journey. With some possible exceptions, they are unable or unwilling to return to their country of 
origin, are unable to regularize their status in the country where they are to be found, and do not 
have access to legal migration opportunities that would enable them to move on to another state’ 
(pp. 2). 
 
Migrants may become stranded due to lack of financial resources to move home; loss of theft of 
documents; detention; and abandonment.  These migrants are particularly vulnerable to human 
rights violations and abuse. Amnesty International (2006) has commented that ‘[t]hose who lack 
official status and the protection of the law are often denied the right to education, health and 
housing services and are condemned to live and work in appalling and degrading conditions.’
 
Amnesty International states that  when the ‘veil of invisibility’ that has kept stranded migrants 
from the public eye is lifted, ‘we discover a group of particularly vulnerable migrants with a 
range of protection and assistance needs. Some find themselves caught in both a physical gap 
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between their country of origin and country of desired destination, and also in a protection gap 
between the country in which they are situated, their country of origin and the international 
protection regime’ (Dowd, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As argued above, on average poorer migrants are more likely to engage in irregular migration.  
And irregular status implies much higher levels of vulnerability.  Thus poverty and outcomes are 
moderated by irregular status. Poorer migrants need to weigh up if increased income 
compensates for a plethora of possible disadvantages such as: deskilling; extortion; exclusion; 
insecurity; discrimination; lack of rights; lack of safety at work,etc. Below we draw on 
qualitative interviews with Ghanaians and Malawians in the UK, Ghanaians returned from 
Nigeria, and Malawians in South Africa, to highlight the forms of disadvantage that migrants 
Transit migrants with irregular status 
 
Since 2000 migration control in the Mediterranean has become a growing European priority, 
leading to groups of migrants becoming ‘stuck’ in countries bordering the EU due to its strong 
border controls. Collyer (2006) describes these groups as ‘small, highly vulnerable minorities’, 
whose situation is exacerbated where the countries in question (notably those bordering the EU, 
such as Morocco) have little experience of migration and few provisions to deal with those who 
become stuck within their borders. Collyer’s research identifies these migrants as undocumented, 
and the primary problems facing them as hunger, illness and racketeering from other migrants. 
Amongst those with injuries who sought healthcare from Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF 2005), 
60% attributed their injuries to the Spanish or Moroccoan border guards. Transit migrants in 
Morocco were found to be mainly Congolese and Nigerians. Collyer’s study reports evidence 
that there are around 10,000 undocumented migrants in Morocco, and that the increased intensity 
of border controls has led to greater danger in being a transit migrant, and increased difficulty in 
surviving. The average length of stay of these migrants was found to be high, at 15.4 months. 
 
A study of transit migrants in Libya (Hamood 2006) found that there were four distinct forms of 
‘holding pattern’ for these groups: detention centres designed for short stay, those for long stay, 
open camp-villages which migrants could exit to work, and repatriation centres which 
accommodate those being voluntarily repatriated while their papers are processed. Problems 
with these centres, according to the report, included the fact that women were not held separately 
from men, and that unaccompanied minors were held together with adults. The European 
Commission found that the conditions in many of these camps were extremely poor. According 
to the report, Libya’s more formal ghettoisation of these migrants, many of them from Sudan or 
Egypt and in various stages of the asylum-seeking process, was designed to keep them separate 
from Libyan citizens and to stop them from seeking the various kinds of formal social protection 
that might be open to them if they were able to mix freely with the population. The migrants 
reported that they were subject to constant racism and abuse by native Libyans and that the 
authorities did not enforce their rights. 
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face along with the comprised opportunities open to them.  Nonetheless, these people have 
chosen to migrate despite the odds.   
 
5. Impacts of Status Disadvantage on Human Development Outcomes  
“Once you have a permit, you are free”.7  
 
In section 3 above we reviewed the reasons why migrants may choose to become or remain 
irregular.  A number of advantages with regard to direct economic (income) benefits are 
observed. However, the choice to remain irregular implies large opportunity costs in a range of 
areas.  Disadvantages associated with irregularity (as discussed in the conceptual section) impact 
a whole range of human development outcomes.  This section reviews a range of HD indictors 
with respect to the impact from irregular status.  We draw on a wide range of literature, 
supplementing it with primary evidence from migrants themselves. 
 
Income 
Perhaps the primary way in which the problems of differences in legal status manifest 
themselves is through the labour market and migrants’ economic opportunities. Workers’ rights 
generally cannot be enforced for the undocumented, they cannot be accurately counted or 
assessed, and are correspondingly more vulnerable to employer abuses that lead to reduced 
earnings and ability to remit.  
 
Many of these effects are likely to be indirect. Migrant workers who are brought by recruiters to 
work in developed countries may be either legal or undocumented, but their rights are likely to 
be constrained by a lack of networks and knowledge of the receiving country. This occurs 
wherever recruited migrant labour exists in significant numbers. For the legal but bonded 
migrant, dependence on a single employer/recruiter (which may be exacerbated for those present 
on temporary worker visas which tie them to a single employer) leads to financial abuses such 
as: fines for not fulfilling quotas; forced withdrawal of wages for payment of ‘debt’ for 
equipment or travel; excessive interest repayment on debt; and non-payment or extremely low 
payment of wages. Anderson and Rogaly (2005) term this ‘super-exploitation’. They note that 
                                                
7 (quote from and interview with a Malawian female irregular migrant living in Jo’Burg, SA. 2007) 
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this problem is far worse for undocumented migrants since they are often smuggled and therefore 
have to pay off fees when they work.   
 
The right to change employers is important in mitigating wage disparities between legal and 
undocumented workers. Even legal migrants in many countries do not have the right to change 
jobs (Anderson et al. 2006).  This type of restriction is generally focused on low-skilled workers, 
as in Asia, where Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and Korea have all passed laws 
designed to restrict workers’ mobility and access to jobs. This leads to multiple inefficiencies: 
workers cannot access jobs, are punished where they work without authorisation, and are 
deported or imprisoned. Some states such as Malaysia allow freelance companies acting as 
vigilantes to deport the undocumented (Xiang 2008), while others such as Korea impose fines on 
apprehended irregular migrants before deporting them, and subsequently make them pay the 
costs of deportation. 
 
In these restrictive labour markets, there are also hidden penalties for remaining undocumented. 
Domestic workers’ lack of legal status, for instance, gives their employers power to withhold 
earnings and pay below minimum wage, and also means they cannot open a bank account to save 
their money (Punpuing et al. 2005). 
 
For those who do not overstay a visa or transfer from an authorised job to an unauthorised one, 
becoming an undocumented migrant usually involves some form of smuggling. The cost of 
unauthorised border-crossing often forms a heavy burden where the migrant would otherwise be 
generating capital to benefit themselves or those left behind. There is an important difference 
between the prepaid and postpaid smuggling fee in its impact on migrants and their households. 
Van Liemt (2004) observes that ‘the probability of getting into debt to the trafficker is lower 
when the trip has been prepaid than when it is being post-paid.’  
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Mexican Migration Project data (Massey 2005) records the price of being smuggled from 
Mexico into the US as rising from $400 in 1993 to $1,200 by 1999, and today it is $3,000. In 
2003 an illegal crossing by boat from Morocco to Spain cost approximately US$200 for minors, 
US$500 to US$800 for Moroccans, and between US$800 and US$1,200 for sub-Saharan 
Africans (Lahlou 2003). The SIMI survey respondents, from a mixture of North African and 
Middle Eastern countries reported that, on average, migration cost their families 2 years of 
earnings. In the US, irregular workers can recoup their smuggling costs relatively fast. Hanson 
(2006) estimates that in 2000, a 23-27 year-old recent Mexican migrant with 5 to 8 years of 
Bribery and Extortion 
 
Irregular migrants, especially South-South migrants, are frequently required to pay substantial bribes 
to officials to allow them to remain in the destination. The story recounted by Frans, a Malawian 
irregular migrant in Jo’Burg, illustrates the institutionalised nature of this type of exploitation of 
migrants: 
 
“I used the bus to travel to South Africa from Malawi. I did have a passport and a visitor’s visa for 
one month. I knew I would never get legal permission to work here. Like everybody else, I simply 
stayed on after my visa expired. I was arrested 3 times – the first time was in 1993 – for having an 
expired visa and no work permit. They sent me to Morningside Jail where I remained for 5 days. My 
brother-in-law bribed one of the guards with R700.00 to let me go. The other two times I was 
arrested, my brother-in-law did the same thing, although the price went up each time: the last time 
was in 1994 when he had to pay R850.00 to get me released. 
 
It is common for Malawians (and all other foreigners in South Africa) to bribe officials for various 
things – it all depends on how much money you have. If, like me, you are not rich, you’ll only afford 
to pay small money to be released if you are caught. If you have enough money, you can pay an 
official to get you a South African ID (identity) book. 
 
I used to visit Malawi during those years using my passport and expired visa. I simply paid the 
border official R50.00 to allow me to cross. I did that each time I travelled to Malawi. Many others 
were doing the same thing. Although R50.00 isn’t a lot, when you add all the fifties from all the 
people crossing with expired documents, those guards made a lot of money each day. We are not 
happy bribing officials, but if it is the only way of staying on and working, then we will have to do it. 
We all have to support our families, so we are prepared to do anything to remain here.” 
 
On coping with illegal status, Abu, a Ghanaian returnee from Nigeria, says that when he is stopped 
by police, he bribes them and they allow him to go, as long as he has his passport on him.  The 
amount of the bribe is random. The police do not take it directly, but ask him (others have had the 
same experience) to put the money on the dashboard of the car, or somewhere, so they do not handle 
the cash directly. Anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes the police confiscate the passport and 
sell it to Nigerians, who run businesses in fraudulent duplication of passports.  They also sometimes 
tear up documents in front of migrants.   
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schooling would make back his smuggling costs of $2,000 in 313 hours, or 7.8 weeks based on a 
40-hour working week. 
 
Meanwhile, Koser’s study of 50 labour migrants smuggled from Pakistan and Afghanistan to the 
UK (2008) looks at comparative prices for being smuggled from the two countries, and their 
effects on migrants’ level of debt and propensity to remit. The group was composed of mainly 
male migrants travelling without families, half of them university educated. Fees ranged from 
$20,000 (to the US and Canada) to $3,000 (overland to the EU). On average, it took these 
migrants two years to pay off the smuggling fees with their remittances. However, after that, 
remittances more than doubled their households’ income, leading to the conclusion that even 
undocumented migrants who pay high fees to be smuggled still contribute to reducing poverty at 
home. 
 
Migrants also suffer economically from a lack of rights to financial services, since they cannot 
start bank accounts without documentation about their legal status. Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Bansak (2006), using data from the Mexican Migration Project, found that legal status was 
related to whether or not Mexican migrants in the US were banked, and that in turn their access 
to banks was related to the amount of capital they brought home with them upon return. Being 
unbanked due to undocumented status has also been shown to hinder Burmese migrants in 
Thailand from remitting (Koetsawang 2001). 
 
Labour subcontracting is an important factor driving workers’ lack of rights with respect to 
migration, whether documented or undocumented. It distorts the way that legal migrants enter 
the labour market (concentrating them into specific jobs where abuses develop due to a lack of 
enforcement); it leads to specific abuses such as low pay, substandard accommodation and 
working conditions, and a dissociation by the overall employer with workers’ wellbeing. As the 
research of Evans et al. (2005) shows, this problem is so great among legal workers that it 
indicates an even greater problem for those without the basic protection of legal presence in the 
country. Equally, these abuses can lead legal subcontracted workers to overstay, change 
employers, or otherwise move out of their original position in the labour market into even more 
precarious conditions. 
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As opposed to subcontracted authorised migrants, who will be in sectors such as 
mining/agriculture/services, but are at least visible because they are on official visa programs, 
the unauthorised will be recruited for the most extreme/least formal 3D jobs such as informal 
construction and mining, prostitution, kitchen and marginal agricultural work. These latter 
occupations are the hardest to make an impact on in terms of decent conditions in the first place. 
It is thus, easier to exploit workers because they are less visible. Conditions of bonded labour are 
most likely to go unremarked in these occupations as people pay off recruiters' fees. 
 
Education 
Inadequate access to education particularly impacts undocumented migrants, but can be an issue 
for legal migrants as well. One fundamental issue for most migrants is learning the language of 
their receiving country, but this is seldom funded adequately or realistically by governments 
(MPI 2007). Moreover, new arrivals are often ghettoised, or at least segregated, in ways that 
reduce their access to education.  
 
The FIDH (2008) studied the conditions of documented and undocumented migrants in South 
Africa during 2007. It concluded that both groups faced serious problems in accessing education 
for their children. In the case of documented migrants this was because the authorities tended to 
claim that they had insufficient documentation to enrol their children. The report found that 
although this group should have had recourse to legal means of enforcing their right to an 
education for their children, they were not aware or able to access the information or the help of 
the relevant authorities. Both problems were even worse for the undocumented, who had no 
proof of residency at all and therefore could not access education for their families, nor did they 
have the right to appeal. 
 
Rossi (2008) found that children migrating with their parents to richer countries within the 
developing world were likely to have better access to education. However, these may not do well 
in comparison with their native counterparts: evidence from industrialised receiving countries 
shows that migrant children are among the lowest-scoring in their age groups on standardised 
tests. Statistics are not yet collected for non-OECD countries, however. According to the same 
report, the worst challenges are faced by children who migrate between developing countries 
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with parents who are on temporary worker visas, i.e. those whose only legal status is by 
association and in any case is tenuous; and by those who migrate alone (and therefore 
undocumented). These children were unlikely to be able to access education at all, due to ‘social 
and cultural isolation, strenuous and hazardous work, extreme poverty, poor health conditions 
and language barriers’ (ibid.)    
 
Legal migrants (who are not refugees) in the primary migrant-receiving states of the USA do not 
benefit from any targeted funding to help them learn English, and legally resident migrant 
children often receive substandard education because of ethnic segregation that groups together 
newcomers in schools that receive no extra funding for their language-learning (MPI 2007). In 
the UK, there is some evidence that those who migrate for education may be exploited by 
receiving-country colleges, which are able to charge higher fees for foreign students. These 
institutions often recruit intensively without providing adequate information for foreign students, 
putting them in a situation where they are responsible for their own compliance with the rules but 
lack the information to preserve their status (Taylor 2009).  
 
The undocumented are highly impacted by inadequate or discriminatory educational provision 
because they are predominantly young. For example, the undocumented population 
(predominantly low-income Latinos) in the US historically has an extremely low school 
completion rate: according to the 2000 Census, only 40 per cent of undocumented Latino males 
between 18 and 24 who arrived in the United States before the age of 16 had completed high 
school or obtained a GED (an equivalent qualification). 
 
The World Development Report (World Bank 2007) shows that 50-90 per cent of youth report 
that they would like to migrate, mainly temporarily.  A third of the migrant flow from developing 
countries are aged 12 to 24. Young undocumented migrants suffer problems when they reach the 
end of the period in which schooling is legally mandated and therefore free. For example, in the 
US in 2006 there were an estimated 1,075,000 unauthorised youth aged between 5 and 24 
(Batalova and Fix 2006) for whom legal status presented a serious challenge to their ability to 
access education. Although federal law mandates that these migrants receive free schooling up to 
the age of 18, the undocumented cannot receive funding to attend colleges (particularly public 
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institutions) in the United States. 360,000 of these youth were already in this position since they 
were over the age of 18. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health 
Like education, healthcare is problematic in different ways for legal and undocumented migrants, 
with problems of cost and access clearly worse for the unauthorised. Temporary migrants rarely 
have access to the full range of health services in the receiving country (Anderson et al. 2006), 
nor can they get insurance from countries of origin. Migrants who are longer term residents for 
the purposes of employment, however, have a right to such treatment (ibid.). Yet often treatment 
in industrialised countries is too expensive for new arrivals, or those who are sending money 
Deskilling and Lack of Dignity 
 
A common refrain among irregular Ghanaian migrant workers in the UK was how a lack of choice 
forced them to accept any work offered, regardless of the type of work or whether or not they felt it 
corresponded with their education and skills. De-skilling describes the process whereby migrant 
workers accept work that does not match their education or skills.  Of the Ghanaian migrant workers 
interviewed, 84.5 per cent had at least tertiary level qualification, and roughly half had acquired 
additional qualifications in the UK.  Yet, of the migrant workers interviewed, 42 per cent held low-
paid jobs characterised by low pay and few work-based entitlements.  Many of the respondents 
described their work as not matching their education.  Ben, who holds an undergraduate degree and 
is pursuing an MBA, said the following of his work experience:  
 
I took whatever job was available.  I am not fussy. At all of these jobs I worked with people who 
mostly didn’t even have a degree.  It was not very taxing on my brain. I want something I can 
really enjoy.   
 
Ken similarly remarked: “you can’t finish university and produce sandwiches.”  Faced with 
informal practices that position them in low-paid, insecure work, many migrant workers accept their 
situation to realize their desire to be continuously employed.   
 
The centrality of employment for many Ghanaian migrant workers is further reflected in how it was 
presented as a key component of living a dignified life.  More specifically, dignity was often 
described as having a job commensurate with the level of education the migrant worker had 
obtained.   For Ed, this was associated with “an office job that uses my brain, not my energy.”  Yet, 
for many respondents, the power of the social norms exercised by employers and employment 
agencies made this an elusive dream. 
 
For the Ghanaian migrant workers interviewed, continuous employment was repeatedly identified as 
a key social protection strategy within a web of rules that had successfully closed-off access to state-
, market- and employment-based social protection.  The effectiveness of the strategy may be 
undermined, however, by the fact that many of their work histories were littered with low-paid 
employment and the high prevalence of de-skilling.   
       ~excerpt from Coll-Black (2007)  
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home. Thus although higher healthcare costs can present barriers to access for natives as much as 
migrants, those barriers are higher for the poorer and less secure. 
 
A report from PICUM (2007) evaluating the situation of migrants with regard to healthcare in 
the EU found that there were many barriers specific to the undocumented. While language 
barriers and racism from the authorities and social workers in particular were problems affecting 
migrants regardless of legal status, the report identified five main problems specific to those 
without legal status. First, they cannot provide documentation to prove that they are able to pay 
hospital bills, leading to denial of care in many cases. There is also a lack of information on 
entitlements for undocumented migrants in the healthcare system, so that they do not know 
whether they can access care or not. When they do access it, medical care often costs more than 
they can pay, and without translators and cultural mediators it can be difficult for them to choose 
between treatment options and control the care they receive. Finally, in countries such as 
Germany, Sweden and France, there is a ‘responsibility to report’, where the healthcare provider 
must legally inform the authorities if they know they are treating an undocumented migrant. 
These conditions lead to a lack of trust between providers and patients, and often mean that 
patients do not seek care in the first place. 
 
A study by Medecins du Monde (2007) looks at access to healthcare for documented and 
undocumented migrants. It identifies the main issues for migrants in general as precarious 
housing conditions, poverty, and lack of awareness of rights (particularly to health coverage). 
The latter is something that particularly affects those most in need of regular or preventative 
healthcare (the HIV positive, women of reproductive age, and children). The report notes that 
these issues are much greater among the undocumented, mainly because of poverty, and 
concludes that ‘in most cases undocumented migrants do not have effective access to prevention 
and treatment unless it is free’. 
 
These problems can be greater for women, whose healthcare needs are different from and, in the 
case of reproductive health, less negotiable than men’s. A study comparing undocumented 
women migrants to legal residents in Switzerland (Wolff et al. 2008) demonstrates that the 
undocumented have more unintended pregnancies and delayed prenatal care and use fewer 
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preventive measures. Similarly, a study of undocumented mothers in Colorado (Reed et al. 2005) 
found that they had higher rates of the pregnancy-related risk factors that were amenable to 
preventative care, but were not receiving the prenatal care that would address these risks. 
 
Access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Differential Access to Welfare Services at Destination 
 
Access to social welfare is highly dependent upon the welfare state and supporting legislation and 
structures within each country.  For instance, many migrants were able to access state health and 
education services in the UK, but migrants in South Africa were largely excluded from these services. 
In both cases, however, access to transnational social networks arguably served as migrants’ main 
‘safety net’ against the risks posed by international migration. This difference is in large part due to the 
fundamentally different welfare systems of the receiving country.  In the UK, free public health and 
schooling based on universalistic principles has led to limited policing of ‘foreigner’ abuse of the 
system. To be enrolled in school all that is required is evidence of permanent residence (and address).  
The immigration department does not regularly share information with the education and health 
departments. On the other hand, in South Africa much health and education are largely within the 
private sphere.  Furthermore, ID cards are required for registration for all social services.  Where ID 
numbers are less that 13 digits long (indicating  non-citizen status), rights and entitlements are severely 
restricted.  Irregular migrants have extremely limited opportunities to access services. 
 
Of the UK health and education systems, a Malawian migrant claims:  
 
“ It is not difficult for the children of illegal migrants to get into a school or even for illegal migrants 
to get seen by an NHS doctor because schools and surgeries don’t ask questions about the status of 
people who come to them. There is no communication between the Home Office and Education and 
Health. So, even if you are an illegal, the school or surgery won’t ask for any documentation. You are 
free to register.” 
 
The past lax immigration laws have also allowed otherwise non-residents access to the education 
system. 
 
“Others have made arrangements like my wife’s. She brought her sister’s children to the UK as her 
own. No questions were asked at the airport: she simply claimed that they were her own children. Now 
they are both in school, living with their mother. It is common among migrants to do this for each 
other.” 
 
The South African situation is very different: 
 
“I came to South Africa because my husband was here and I was pregnant with our second child. We 
didn’t know that you needed a South African ID number to go to hospital. Luckily, when the time came 
to have the child, I used the ID of a Malawian woman who has managed to get an ID. We look nearly 
the same, so I was able to deliver the baby in hospital.” 
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Current knowledge indicates that there are many under-researched effects of undocumented 
status on mental health. A study of Chinese patients in New York (Law et al. 2003) found that 
they were more likely to be hospitalised, and also more likely to have this occur more than once. 
They were also less likely to engage in and comply with treatment. This study implies that there 
are cultural problems in access to healthcare for the undocumented, exacerbated by the effects of 
their status on social integration (e.g. language skills that allow them to communicate with 
doctors, and understanding of and potential to recuperate from illness.) 
 
Another dimension of health relating to migration is insecure working environments. A report by 
the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (McKay et al. 2006) found that immigrant workers in 
general were frequently subjected to unacceptably dangerous conditions at work. They attributed 
this to a range of factors: the study confirmed that undocumented workers tend to be young, male 
and less risk-averse than legally resident workers; they tend to congregate in the dirty, difficult 
and dangerous jobs that workers; and they are often subject to coercive recruiting and 
subcontracting procedures that enable employers to expose them to extreme workplace 
conditions. In the UK, the report found that Chinese workers were most likely to fall into this 
category of undocumented workers in dangerous jobs. The undocumented surveyed were much 
more likely than legal workers to rate their jobs as dangerous, their employers as unconcerned 
with safety at work, and to say that they had no ability to seek enforcement of their rights. They 
were also less likely to have been trained for the jobs they were doing, and more likely to have 
observed accidents at work. 
 
Migrants’ physical integrity is often at risk, for the undocumented in particular. One dimension 
of this is hazardous border crossings. Cornelius’ 2006 study of the effects of the US 
government’s attempts to close its border to Mexican undocumented migrants demonstrates that 
the measures taken ‘have forced migrants to attempt entry in extremely hazardous mountain and 
desert areas, rather than the relatively safe urban corridors traditionally used’, and that this has 
caused a ten-fold increase in migrant deaths since 1995. Since that year, more than 4,045 
migrants have died from causes including dehydration, hypothermia and drowning.  
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Anderson and Rogaly (2005) outline a number of ways that violence is perpetrated specifically 
against migrants, including threats regarding their immigration status, withdrawal of means of 
survival, and threats against the physical integrity of self or family.  
 
Physical violence 
 Immigrants are often subject to violence and threats of violence by the native population. These 
often accompany an upswing in undocumented migration, as has been formalised by the 
vigilante ‘Minutemen’ movement in the US (Reuters 2005), but over the last decade rising levels 
of migration worldwide have been met with numerous acts of extreme violence that are 
unprecedented in recent decades. In May 2008 South Africa demonstrated the potential for 
violence against migrants by the domestic population when the influx of foreigners looking for 
work, driven by economic and political conditions in neighbouring countries, led to xenophobic 
attacks (Guardian 2008). Similar attacks have occurred against Moroccans in Spain (BBC 2000), 
and against immigrant hostels all over Europe (YaleGlobal 2006).  
 
Legal status clearly plays a role in violence against women. Raj and Silverman (2002), in their 
study of violence against immigrant women in the US, cite undocumented status as one of the 
most important factors exacerbating the risk of this type of violence, since the threat of 
deportation prevents victims from seeking help. They note that legal permanent residents are also 
at high risk because their status is not necessarily safe if their partner is the one being violent, but 
that on balance they have more chance of seeking safety than the undocumented. Undocumented 
women, this study shows, are often doubly threatened with deportation, by their partners and the 
government. The study also shows that among immigrant women, those who are undocumented 
are less likely to seek social and health services due to isolation and fear of deportation, and that 
they tend to be unaware of available services, which they may not be linguistically or culturally 
competent to use if accessed. 
 
Social protection  
Existing social protection measures for workers are often a problem for migrants in developed 
countries. A Canadian report (Elgersma 2007) notes that migrant workers who are legal derive 
no benefit from basic employment insurance and often work in non-unionized sectors, reducing 
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their recourse in cases of employment or other economic shocks and generating systemic 
instability in certain sectors. 
 
Even in a nation as wealthy as the US, the comparative financial disadvantage of being 
undocumented, and the concurrent lack of access to basic social protection programs that cover 
poor families, leads to concerns surrounding health and nutrition for this group in particular. A 
2008 study (Hadley et al.) indicates that among undocumented migrants living in the US, 
uncertain and unpredictable work schedules and limited access to public assistance seem to 
contribute to high levels of food insecurity and hunger, which in turn may also negatively affect 
mental and physical health. The study also finds that the longer an undocumented migrant lives 
in the US, the poorer their health indicators. 
 
The richer receiving countries have tightened the provisions of their social protection systems so 
that migrants cannot gain access. One example is the Netherlands, where for non-permanent 
residents there is a conflict where access is based on residency, but keeping residency is 
predicated on not claiming any kind of benefit. The country’s ‘linkage act’ has made it possible 
for the government to exclude migrants from services such as healthcare, which since the 1970s 
was available to refugees and later asylum-seekers, but has now been restricted. As with all 
social protection restrictions, barriers such as these form an even greater problem for the poorer 
undocumented migrants, 129,000 of whom in the Netherlands have no social benefits (Siegel 
2008). 
 
Remittances function as a form of social protection for migrants’ families and communities. 
Punishing workers financially for unauthorised status reduces their ability to earn and remit, and 
leads to greater need and therefore increased undocumented migration. Remittances have 
important effects on basic health and survival among those left behind: a survey from Pakistan 
(Mansuri 2006) shows that having a migrant family member leads to increased nutrition and 
better health outcomes, for girls in particular, in poor families. The study, which deals with 
households whose members migrate to the Gulf States, notes the ‘positive and extremely 
significant’ impact on height-for-age in girls, a change which is also sustained over time. 
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Civic participation 
The chief ways in which documented migrants experience vulnerabilities in this area have to do 
with integration and acculturation and the provisions for these by the receiving country. Voting 
rights are important on the local level, so that migrants can have input into issues that affect them 
immediately, such as schools and local budgeting. 25 migrant-receiving countries and an EU-
wide treaty have established these rights over the last half-century. However, aside from EU 
citizens in other EU countries, migrant suffrage beyond the most local level is highly unusual 
(Earnest 2003), and no countries currently award suffrage to the undocumented. 
 
Social exclusion takes various forms beyond a lack of representation. It ranges from ignoring the 
specific needs of immigrant groups to exclusion from social or cultural activities and from the 
economic opportunity that allows people to integrate and claim their rights in receiving 
countries. A report from the Canadian government (Elgersma 2007) addresses the more insidious 
nature of problems with exclusion: even legal workers may be dissuaded from fighting unjust 
treatment because their temporary status influences their perceptions of their rights and 
entitlements. The threat of repatriation is ever-present, and is even greater for undocumented 
workers. In terms of proactive actions by government or others, systemic actions are needed to 
address language barriers, isolation, racism, harassment, and to encourage social linkages 
between native-born and immigrant groups. 
 
Dignity  
 
“Eish, life here is hard.  We are exploited;  we are chased away;  the police harass us;  
the [black] South Africans call us “kwerekwere”;  the criminals attack us, and it is 
dangerous to go out at night.  This is not home.  Home is friendly, home is safe, home is 
best.  You can have money here, but you are not happy;  you don’t enjoy it the same way 
as at home.  Here you are not safe.”(Malawian migrant in Jo’Burg) 
 
Although dignity is inevitably a factor in each of the categories of human development, it can be 
isolated as something especially challenged by the inequalities that migration, and undocumented 
migration in particular, tends to generate in areas both of destination and origin. There are 
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several receiving-country dimensions, beginning with those tied to work and employer abuses. 
Migrant vulnerabilities in this area also revolve around having access to the same rights and 
services as others in the receiving country, as much as around basic rights such as adequate 
nutrition. This is also an issue, however, in many sending countries, where large scale migration 
can lead to the development of imbalances in service provision that lead to and reinforce both 
visible and felt inequalities between migrants and non-migrants and their families.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excessive dependence on employers/third parties 
 Rogaly and Anderson identify several problems caused by migrants’ dependence on those who 
sponsor them into the receiving country. These include passport or ID card retention which, for 
example, the UK NGO Kalayaan estimates occurs with 50 per cent of domestic workers (IRR 
2003). Anderson and Rogaly (2005) also posit that these problems include incarceration; 
enforced social isolation; prevention from organising; high personal dependence on 
employers/agents; promotion of ignorance of rights; and the provision of grossly sub-standard 
living conditions to legal and undocumented migrants. All these problems are exacerbated by 
undocumented status.  
 
Dignity, fear isolation 
 
Irregular status often breeds insecurity, fear and isolation for the migrant.  Redson’s sister-in-law 
came from Malawi to the UK as a student. When her course finished, she decided to stay on. But her 
visa had already expired by this time. She is now having a case with the Home Office – i.e. 
explaining the reason for allowing it to expire and asking for permission to remain on the grounds of 
being a student. Since her case is still with the Home Office, and they have her passport, she is not 
entitled to work. But she does and earns about £60 per week, which Redsons’s wife supplements by 
sending her £50 per week. 
 
She lives in constant terror of being caught. When she is on the street and she sees a police car or 
officer, she just gets onto the first passing bus irrespective of where it is going! She does not answer 
her door; neither does she give her phone number to her sister. They wait for her to call them. But 
she nonetheless still prefers to remain in the UK, even under these circumstances because what she 
earns in the UK is more than what she would at home. She has no prospects in Malawi at all. Most 
irregular Malawians are in this position: their situation here is terrible, but it is better than back in 
Malawi. 
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Inequity relating to gender  
Gendered inequalities are often exacerbated by migration, and particularly by the lack of access 
to rights and protection when women migrate undocumented. Although migration as a rule can 
empower women by exposing them to cultures where they are awarded more or different rights, 
undocumented status can result in the opposite, where women end up in oppressive labour or 
family conditions without rights. A Caritas report from 2006 quotes a study from the Netherlands 
in 2001 showing that undocumented women are at greater risk of homelessness as their status (or 
lack of it) is often tied to that of their partners, and thus they can be more vulnerable, both to ill 
treatment and violence, and to destitution if they escape to a shelter. 
 
Undocumented women’s lack of access to social protection is demonstrated by the difference in 
their labour market behaviour when they are legalised. This was illustrated in a study by 
Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2006), who used a quasi-experimental framework to assess the 
differential effects of legalisation on men and women’s labour market outcomes and wages. 
Using data from the 1987 and 1992 waves of the LPS and NLSY79 surveys, they found that 
legalisation led to increased wages and job mobility for men, and similarly increased wages but 
reduced labour market attachment for women, who were 7.7 per cent more likely to exit the 
workforce once they became eligible for social benefits. 
 
In table 6 below we illustrate the outcomes of different forms of discrimination and exclusion 
against irregular migrants across different indicators.  We draw examples from three countries 
only using some of the information provided in this section..  This could be extended to many 
more countries. 
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Table 6: Comparative discrimination against authorised, temporary and unauthorised migrants 
 
  Income Healthcare Education Costs of 
migrating 
Labour 
market issues 
THAILAND 
 
Auth. 
 
 
Registratio
n/ 
legalisatio
n process 
acts as a 
tax 
Information 
and 
outreach 
insufficient 
in migrant 
areas. 
Children 
of 
migrants 
are 
generally 
born 
stateless, 
lack 
registratio
n, cannot 
access 
education 
High: work 
permit costs 
a month’s 
wages for 
average 
migrant  
- Registration 
process 
makes it 
difficult to 
change 
employers 
- worker 
exploitation 
in migrant 
sectors 
 
 
Temp. 
 
 
Registratio
n/ 
legalisatio
n process 
acts as a 
tax 
Temp. 
worker 
registration 
includes 
healthcare 
payment – 
very limited 
services 
available. 
Children 
of 
migrants 
are 
generally 
born 
stateless, 
lack 
registratio
n, cannot 
access 
education 
Payments to 
recruiters 
often result 
in debt 
bondage for 
migrant 
workers in 
low-skilled 
urban 
sectors 
Temporary 
workers 
confined to a 
single 
employer; no 
enforcement 
of worker 
rights. 
 
 
Unaut
h. 
 
 
- Higher 
(less 
extortion)
;  
- but less 
opportuni
ty to 
remit 
safely 
Cost 
decreases 
access 
Work 
generally 
takes 
precedenc
e over 
education 
for 
migrant 
children 
70% of 
undocument
ed are 
Burmese, 
thus relative 
ease of 
transit. 
- Avoiding 
registration 
process 
allows 
workers to 
change jobs, 
move around 
country. 
- No 
enforcement 
of worker 
rights 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
Auth. 
 
 
- Foreign 
workers 
are paid 
less than 
minimum 
- Extra fees 
levied on 
foreigners; 
- providers 
often deny 
-
documenta
tion reqs. 
used to bar 
foreign 
Work 
migrants are 
generally 
from 
neighbourin
- lack of 
rights 
enforcement 
- workplace 
violence 
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wage in 
skilled and 
unskilled 
jobs. 
- 
Foreigners 
cannot 
open bank 
accounts, 
cannot 
receive 
state-
funded 
worker 
benefits 
- legality 
found to 
heighten 
positive 
wage 
effect 
care to 
migrants 
- ID needed 
children; 
- fees and 
permits 
g countries 
– relative 
ease of 
access. 
common 
 
 
Temp. 
 
 
Debt 
bondage 
/contractu
al 
financial 
exploitatio
n are 
frequent 
among 
temp. farm 
workers 
- Extra fees 
levied on 
foreigners; 
- providers 
often deny 
care to 
migrants 
- ID needed 
- 
documenta
tion reqs 
used to bar 
foreigner 
children; 
- fees and 
permits 
Work 
migrants are 
generally 
from 
neighbourin
g countries 
– relative 
ease of 
access. 
- generally 
subcontracted
, with poor 
working 
conditions; 
- status is tied 
to one 
employer 
 
 
Unaut
h. 
 
 
- 
economic 
outcomes 
depend on 
length of 
stay and 
access to 
social 
protection, 
more than 
status. 
No access 
to 
healthcare, 
including 
for children 
Access 
depends on 
patron-
client 
employer 
relations 
- No 
access; 
- No 
recourse to 
courts/ 
enforceme
nt of right 
to 
education 
- bribes 
often paid 
to border 
guards;  
- bribes to 
evade jail 
due to 
irregular 
status are 
high. 
- labour laws 
apply to 
undocumente
d, but are not 
enforced. 
- deported 
workers have 
no right to 
claim wages 
USA 
 
Auth. 
 
 
Gaining 
citizenship 
positively 
No access 
to programs 
for low-
- lack of 
specialist 
English 
Permanent 
visa costs 
are high. 
Worker 
benefits 
(pensions, 
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impacts 
wages. 
income 
people 
language 
teaching in 
new 
destination 
areas 
insurance, 
compensation 
etc) are 
generally 
dependent on 
citizenship 
status rather 
than legal 
worker 
status. 
 
 
Temp. 
 
 
No 
significant 
difference 
in wages 
between 
temporary/ 
unauthoris
ed workers 
in similar 
sectors. 
- Restricted 
access to 
healthcare 
- no access 
to low-
income 
programs 
- 
temporary 
migrants 
are most 
likely to 
be in new 
areas with 
few 
language 
provisions 
for 
children 
Entry via 
subcontract
ors 
/recruiters 
often leads 
to lower 
paying jobs. 
Labour 
abuses (pay, 
accommodati
on, 
conditions) 
often force 
subcontracted 
workers into 
worse jobs 
and 
undocumente
d status. 
 
 
Unaut
h. 
 
 
No 
enforceme
nt of 
minimum 
wage 
standards 
- Care is 
generally 
unaffordab
le; 
- unaware 
of rights 
- Right to 
primary  
and 
secondary 
education 
for all 
children 
- no access 
to college 
loans  
Smuggling 
costs are 
high due to 
border 
enforcemen
t, but 
irregular 
workers 
make back 
their costs 
in a few 
months. 
3-year 
crackdown 
on 
undocumente
d labour – 
prosecutions, 
deportations 
 
6.Conclusions 
The underpinning hypothesis of this paper has been that, as long as poverty drives migration, 
legal status will not be a priority for migrants. In other words, formal barriers to migration will 
not significantly stem irregular migration flows. Migrants will be willing to endure short to 
medium term hardship and an undermining of a range of capabilities and rights (such as 
education, social assets, rights and personal welfare) to provide economic safety nets for their 
families and future improvements in their (and their families’) livelihoods and wellbeing. We 
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have shown that on average migrants achieve positive increases in income and assets through the 
migration experience, thus they are willing to settle for sub-optimal solutions in which they 
willingly (and strategically) sacrifice a whole range of freedoms and rights.   
 
It is precisely because poorer migrants are unable to attain first best solutions, whereby they can 
achieve positive development outcomes across a range of indicators – economic, social and 
political – that governments and policy makers must act as protectors of rights and freedoms and 
as facilitators of positive migration outcomes. Creative solutions are needed in order to maximise 
the benefits and minimise the risks of migration for irregular migrants. Host governments are 
faced with a dilemma, given that tighter border controls have not stopped migratory flows, but 
rather created more diverse migrant strategies. Formalising the status of irregular migrants would 
likely improve these migrants’ rights and security — and increase migrant remittances, making 
migration more beneficial to migrant sending countries. However, such policies must contend 
with the negative attitudes towards irregular migration that are present in many political and 
popular narratives.  It is highly unlikely, given the political sensitivities of regularisation and 
rights for irregular migrants, plus the global financial downturn with its associated labour market 
tightening, that developed countries will like take a liberal stance on irregular migrants in the 
foreseeable future. 
 
Given this, if developing country governments accept the positive relationship between 
migration and development, then they must also take very seriously the plight of millions of their 
native workers abroad (as regular and irregular migrants).  It is in developing countries’ interests 
to protect their citizens abroad and facilitate the repatriation of their efforts (through better 
remittances channels as well as incentives for return and social protection).  Pursuing this type of 
support may create political tension between developed and developing country policies, 
however political pressure from the Global South is an obvious option. The Global South should 
resist Northern pressures to control borders, but rather recognise the massive contribution that 
much of the migrant population makes to the country, regardless of status. 
 
Legal status is necessary to ensure protection of a range of rights and entitlements for migrants, 
however alone it is not enough.  We need to dispel myths about migrants (irregular ones in 
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particular), increase efforts at community integration, get serious about decent work agendas, 
and commit to the protection of all migrants regardless of status worldwide. 
 
What options do we have? 
 
1. Ensure basic human and social rights to all migrants, independent of their status  
Given the large number of undocumented migrants and their weak legal and social position, it 
appears that the most effective way to enhance the social protection of migrants in SADC—and 
maybe most low-income countries—is to ensure basic human and social rights for them. Due to 
their undocumented status, many migrants easily fall victim to exploitation, in particular 
vulnerable groups like women. Other problems migrants may face are freedom of association, 
isolation, exclusion and xenophobia. These problems erode the benefits of migration for all 
parties and seriously undermine its development impact, including productive employment and 
decent work. Governments need to get serious about upholding human rights laws, such that 
migrants are entitled to basic services, freedom from exploitation and a right to a fair trial. 
Taking seriously, also, a Decent Work agenda must translate into more labour market monitoring 
and ensuring workplace safety.  Granting basic human and social rights is also in the interest of 
native workers because without such provisions employers have an incentive to favour more 
vulnerable and thus cheaper labour over native workers. In other words, discrimination against 
migrants in terms of social rights also makes migrants cheaper for employers—at the expense of 
native workers.  
 
Where necessary, countries of origin and destination need to put policies, legislation and 
mechanisms in place that provide migrant workers with protection and support from any abuses 
in the labour migration process. Perhaps the best way to move forward on a basic human and 
social protection rights agenda is to establish a country-specific minimum ‘social floor’ which all 
people have a right to, regardless of residency status or legal status.  Such a floor would 
necessarily include access for migrants to emergency health care and access to education for 
children.  
 
2. Support migrant networks and associations 
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As this research project has shown, access to informal social protection is critical for achieving 
positive outcomes from migration, particularly for poorer migrants in a South-South migration 
context. Encouraging and facilitating social networks and informal social protection will help 
migrants reap the benefits from migration. For example, governments could actively support and 
provide funding for migrant associations as well as migrant rights NGOs as a way of supporting 
current migrants—or at the minimum should not undermine informal migrant networks and 
instead provide them with an environment where they can duly develop. Informal networks 
could also be used as a channel to improve safety during the migration process. They could be 
used to inform migrants about benefits, costs, and risks of migration during and ideally prior to 
migration. Governments in both sending and destination countries may also attempt to connect 
with migrant networks to learn details about exploitation incidents—for example at the 
workplace—and feed this information into their monitoring process of labour market conditions. 
Finally, one particular concern about informal networks is that their usability for migrants could 
depend on the migrants’ duration of stay. If migrants’ welfare in a South-South migration 
context crucially depends on informal networks, then a sufficient length of stay is important so 
that migrants have to time to build strong ties among themselves. 
 
Clearly it is politically impossible for governments to openly encourage and support the 
activities of undocumented migrants. However, by supporting registered and recognized migrant 
groups, localities and diaspora networks, policies will have the indirect effect of strengthening 
avenues by which undocumented migrants can report instances of abuse and exploitation as well 
as claim basic rights, and at least facilitate spaces where migrants can access networks. 
 
3. Develop effective and safe avenues for remitting for all migrants 
Many migrants are primarily concerned with the welfare of their families back home and 
remittances are the means by which families are supported, homes are built, basic needs are 
purchased, children are schooled and investments are made. Migrants, especially the 
undocumented ones, are often excluded (actively or self-excluded) from financial systems (be it 
a bank, a post office account or a financial intermediary), which is of crucial importance for all 
migrants who want to safely transfer remittances to their families.  Governments and donors 
must think creatively about secure and efficient ways of encouraging and facilitating access to 
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remitting services for all migrants. This would be an obvious advantage for the migrant and for 
the destination economy. It may likely have a longer-term spin off effect whereby migrants begin 
to save and access credit lines. Ensuring migrants’ access to better and safer financial services in 
order to support remittance flows is a particular priority for source country governments, given 
the massive potential that remittances have for development. 
  
4. Create regional and sub-national migrant integration initiatives 
Integration initiatives have been shown to have potential for addressing a range of vulnerabilities 
relating to migration. One successful example can be seen in the US, starting withIllinois, where 
a coalition of migrant NGOs partnered with the state executive to create a set of programs and 
provisions designed to give migrants better access to social protection, representation and 
education, with the end goal of optimising both their social and economic outcomes and the 
state’s ability to benefit from its migrant population. The New Americans Initiative of 2005 
involved programs ranging from instituting bilingual public services to providing skills training 
and English language programs for migrants. The initiative also contained a citizenship and voter 
registration component, with the goal of preserving and expanding migrants’ rights and 
protection. The program was conceived as a progressive intervention, in that it awarded the same 
rights and access to the undocumented as to all other migrants (except noncitizen voting rights), 
thus creating the most impact among the most vulnerable.    
 
The program had a strong PR effect, framing immigrants as an economic opportunity for Illinois. 
It also effectively created Chicago as a safe zone for the undocumented, using an economic 
rationale based on the importance of migrant labour for the manufacturing and service sectors. 
The initiative is currently being replicated by Massachusetts8, where the governor’s office has 
called on state officials, policy advisers, and advocates to hold a series of public meetings across 
the state and draft a report with policy recommendations by July 1, 2009.with elements of the 
idea being replicated at municipal level in California, New York and Maryland. This sub-
national characteristic is arguably the most important factor in creating such a successful 
integration initiative. It avoids a ‘one size fits all’ approach since programs can be tailored to 
answer the needs of local migrant populations, and minimises political opposition, since the 
                                                
8 http://icirr.org/en/node/2962 
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economic rationale that has proved successful in winning native-born voters’ consent can also be 
framed to fit local needs and opportunities. 
 
Other initiatives (described in detail in Van Hear (2008)) currently being implemented in Latin 
America draw on UNHCR and UNDP jointly implemented initiatives from the late 1980s. These 
Quick Implementation Projects (QIPs), aimed at rapidly improving the living standards of the 
population, for instance by building schools, bridges, hospitals, etc. Drawing upon this 
experience and in the framework of the Mexico Plan of Action9, UNHCR allocated more than 
U$3 million to projects similar to the QIPs, benefiting 350 communities and 18,000 people 
between 2005 and 2007 (UNHCR 2007c). Initiatives that benefit not only refugees and other 
migrants but also the local population are very important to reach those who have not been 
granted official status and also to avoid competition, discrimination and xenophobia.  Similarly, 
micro-credit programmes have been developed in the region: UNHCR-funded micro-credit 
schemes in Latin America have supported more than 800 projects and benefited some 2,000 
people between 2005 and 2007 (UNHCR 2007c). Those programmes also target a broad 
audience of refugees, migrants and the local population, avoiding tensions and stimulating the 
local economy in general. 
 
5. Allow for temporary work opportunities through a migration policy framework. Given 
that much migration (particularly South-South) is, first, not a unidirectional, permanent 
phenomenon, and second, to a large extent informal and temporary, demand-driven migration 
programs might offer the best policy framework for migration. Many poorer migrants do not 
want to stay in the host country for very long but rather migrate to earn money for certain 
purposes and leave after having earned enough money. Thus, a temporary migration scheme that 
would grant work permits to migrants to work in seasonal jobs and specific sectors for a limited 
time would be one way to go forward. Additionally, a migration framework should consider the 
significant number of cross-border traders that regularly cross the border for trade purposes. 
These circular migrants, who significantly contribute to the destination economies, should be 
equipped with trade visas to enter the country legally. These measures would lift many migrants 
                                                
9 The  Mexico  Plan  of  Action  was  adopted  by  eighteen  Latin  American  governments  in  2004,  establishing  the 
activities and priorities  to deal with  current  challenges  in  the protection of  refugees  in  the  region, notably  the 
Colombian situation. 
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into the status of legal migrants, which may make it easier for them to improve their livelihoods 
(at destination, in transit and at source) and to eventually improve their access to formal social 
protection.  
 
In addition, any policies attempting to select and control the composition of migration flows are 
likely to fail. As the research has shown, both legal and undocumented migrants are likely to 
benefit from migration, so as long as there is adequate demand for migrants in domestic labour 
markets, undocumented migrants are likely to move. If policy makers seek to formalize 
migration, this reality has to be acknowledged. Therefore, any migration framework should 
include demand driven components that provide strong links between demand in domestic labour 
markets and supply of migrant labour. Control and management of migration via instruments 
such as point-based systems are unlikely to work in contexts such as South Africa where demand 
from the informal and unskilled labour market is met with a supply of undocumented migrants. 
A proper regional migration framework that opens legal opportunities for temporary migration—
including low-skilled migration—is most likely to have the greatest impact.10 
 
6.Consider wide-spread regularisation (depending  on labour market conditions)  
In the EU, regularisation has been both an official and an unofficial tactic to address the presence 
of unauthorised migrants. ICMPD (2008) found widespread examples of both formal and 
informal regularisations throughout the EU, with the formal outnumbering the informal. Since 
1973 there have been 69 regularisation programmes, 87% of them targeted at undocumented 
workers. However beyond formal programmes, administrative regularisation mechanisms 
emerged during the increase in asylum-seekers in the 1990s. Consisting either of giving migrants 
formal documentation or suspending removal orders, these mechanisms largely confer a 
humanitarian right to remain. All but 5 of the EU member states have some form of 
administrative regularisation mechanism. The ten wealthiest EU states, over the period 2005-6,  
regularised 92,874 migrants through these mechanisms. They cover a range of cases, but most 
relate to non-refoulement, health and family ties, statelessness and other exceptional 
                                                
10 A promising example of a regional migration framework is the recently launched Abu Dhabi Dialogue that aims 
at paving the way for the better management of temporary contractual labour mobility between the United Arab 
Emirates and its main sending countries in South Asia. See speech by Luca Dall'Oglio, Permanent Observer to the 
United Nations, at the 46th session of the commission for Social Development: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/1336?entryId=16565 (accessed on 15th June, 2008). 
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circumstances. Portugal has a mechanism whereby those who have been ‘otherwise legally 
employed and resident’ may stay, and France similarly awards legal status to migrants working 
in certain key professions (ICPMD 2008). 
 
In fact, one incentive in favour of unauthorised entry to countries with labour rights that are 
fairly well enforced, such as the US or Spain is undoubtedly the possibility of regularisation 
through amnesty, which has effects on all dimensions of migrants’ wellbeing. The issue of 
whether it impacts them significantly in financial terms is still under debate – for example, a 
study by Kaushal (2006) found that when Nicaraguans and other Central Americans were offered 
an amnesty in 1997, the effect differed according to human capital. The wages of undocumented 
workers who had completed high school were increased by 5%, while the amnesty had no 
statistically significant effect on those with lower levels of education. However, access to social 
protection, services and participation is inevitably raised by regularisation. Both Spain and the 
US have had widely publicised regularisation programs in recent decades, which creates some 
expectation on the part of migrants that they will not have to remain undocumented forever. 
 
Fakiolas (2003) points out that both employers and employees benefit from undeclared 
employment and that is why results and revenue from regularisations are below expectations. 
Legalisations have both positive and negative economic effects on immigrants and on the 
economy. Whether regularisation will have a positive or negative effect on migrant outcomes 
will depend largely on the state of the destination labour market For instance, in a richer Asian or 
Gulf country (see e.g. of Burmese in Thailand), regularising means a loss of flexibility. It may 
imply having to buy a work permit, and possibly the bonding of labour to one employer or 
sector, leading to exploitation. However, in the EU or US, worker protections and social 
protection come with regularisation and migrants can therefore use their income more 
productively. But in those labour markets too, low-skilled labour remains low-skilled, and people 
who regularise will not be able to move out of low-wage occupations.  It may not be possible, 
then, to see a positive outcome on wages. However, one can safely say that regularised workers 
will be less vulnerable to micro shocks such as health crises, and things therefore get less volatile 
than for irregular workers. 
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